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Notes
Drill Here Not There:
Petroleum Leasing and Conservation in
Alaska’s National Petroleum Reserve
Joel Aurora*
This Note analyzes the Department of the Interior’s recent decision to close off several
million acres of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (“NPR-A” or “Reserve”)
from oil and gas leasing while allowing petroleum development on discrete areas of the
Reserve. After discussing the Reserve’s history, this Note examines the Alaska National
Interest Land Conservation Act of 1980 and its relevance to the NPR-A, and analyzes
the petroleum industry’s potential legal arguments against the Interior’s decision. This
Note also argues that the Department of the Interior’s decision is in accordance with its
administrative powers because the Secretary’s decision should not be considered a
formal public land “withdrawal,” but rather, a discretionary decision to deny lease
issuances within certain areas of the Reserve.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and Executive
Articles Editor of the Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor John Leshy for his
expertise and guidance throughout earlier drafts of this Note. Also, many thanks to the staff of the
Hastings Law Journal for their commitment to publishing exceptional scholarship issue after issue.
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Introduction
In December 2012, former Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar
announced the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI” or the “Interior”)
final proposal to allow for increased oil and gas development in the
1
National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (“NPR-A” or “the Reserve”). The
Interior’s blueprint for the NPR-A, which the DOI finalized in February
2
2013 through the issuance of a Record of Decision, will open up millions
of Reserve acres to oil and gas drilling. The proposal also seeks to
1. Press Release, Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Plan for Additional
Development, Wildlife Protection in 23 Million Acre National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (Dec. 19,
2012), available at doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-salazar-announces-plan-for-additionaldevelopment-wildlife-protection-in-23-million-acre-national-petroleum-reserve-alaska.cfm
[hereinafter Salazar Announces Plan].
2. Dep’t of the Interior, Record of Decision, National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
Integrated Activity Plan (Feb. 21, 2013).
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protect wildlife populations such as caribou herds, migratory bird
habitats, and coastal resources that are significant to the Alaska Natives
3
and “our nation’s conservation heritage.” This decision, also known as
the “preferred alternative,” will allow for oil and gas leasing on 11.8
million acres of NPR-A land and designate 13.38 million acres in the
4
NPR-A for protection from development.
The Secretary’s decision came after lengthy consideration of five
potential plans and the Interior’s receipt of over 400,000 public
5
comments. The four rejected alternatives varied in their balancing of
potential development and environmental protection: one option sought
to offer roughly half of NPR-A land to leases; another would have
opened 57% of the Reserve; a third proposed 76%; and yet another
advocated that 100% of NPR-A land be subject to oil and gas
6
development. The preferred alternative will offer 52% of NPR-A
subsurface land to oil and gas leases—an area with an estimated 549
million barrels of discovered and undiscovered oil (72% of the entire
7
Reserve’s estimated oil holdings), and 8.738 trillion cubic feet of
discovered and undiscovered gas (50% of the entire Reserve’s estimated
8
gas). The plan will also classify the remaining land as “special areas”
9
closed to development.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the NPR-A land use decision has created
controversy. In protest, Alaska Governor Sean Parnell sent a letter to
Secretary Salazar in September 2012 withdrawing the state as a
10
“cooperating agency” from the planning agreement for the NPR-A.
Before the preferred alternative was finalized, Alaska Senator Lisa
Murkowski decried the plan for “den[ying] U.S. taxpayers both revenue
and jobs at a time when our nation faces record debt and
3. Salazar Announces Plan, supra note 1.
4. Dep’t of the Interior, NPR-A IAP/EIS Alternatives, available at http://www.blm.gov/
pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/ak/aktest/planning/npr-a_iap_eis.Par.77255.File.dat/NPRA_IAPEIS_Alternative_comparison_table.pdf. A copy of this table is reproduced in Appendix A, infra.
5. Salazar Announces Plan, supra note 1.
6. See infra Appendix A.
7. As a point of comparison, the United States “consumed a total of 6.87 billion barrels [of oil]
(18.83 million barrels per day) in 2011.” Frequently Asked Questions, How Much Oil Does the United
States Consume Per Day, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/
faq.cfm?id=33&t=6. According to these statistics, if all the estimated oil contained in lands opened to
leasing under the preferred alternative were to be fully exploited, the resulting production would
supply the United States with enough oil to meet its consumption needs for about twenty-nine days.
8. The United States consumed approximately 25.46 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2012.
Frequently Asked Questions, How Much Natural Gas Is Consumed (Used) in the U.S.?, U.S. Energy Info.
Admin. (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=50&t=8. Thus, the if all the natural gas
on allowable preferred alternative land was fully exploited, the resulting yields would supply the United
States with enough natural gas to meet its consumption needs for about four to five months.
9. See infra Appendix A.
10. Letter from Gov. Sean Parnell to Sec’y of the Interior Ken Salazar (Sept. 12, 2012), available
at http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell_media/resources_files/09122012_npra_salazar_copy2.pdf.
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11

unemployment.” The oil and gas industry will also likely attack the
Interior’s plan in court.
This Note analyzes the potential arguments that the oil and gas
industry will mount in opposition to the “preferred alternative” and
argues that the plan is entirely in accordance with the statutes governing
the Reserve and Alaska’s public lands in general. First, this Note
examines the historical context of the NPR-A and its originating statute.
Next, this Note discusses the Alaska National Interest Land
12
Conservation Act of 1980 (“ANILCA”) and its relevance to the NPRA, specifically with regard to section 1326 of ANILCA—the so-called
“no more” clause. Next, this Note examines the oil and gas industry’s
potential legal arguments against the Interior’s decision, including the
assertion that the Secretary is exercising a “withdrawal” power to protect
special areas of NPR-A land from petroleum development, an action
that is prohibited in certain circumstances under ANILCA. This Note
contends that the Interior’s preferred alternative is not barred by
ANILCA section 1326 because the Secretary’s action should not be
considered a formal withdrawal. Instead, the preferred alternative should
be viewed merely as a discretionary decision not to issue leases within
certain areas of the Reserve.

I. Background
A. The National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
In 1923, President Warren Harding issued Executive Order 3797-A,
which established Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4 in northern
13
Alaska to serve as an oil reserve for national defense purposes. At the
time, “Harding noted that the future supply of oil for the Navy is at all
14
times a matter of national concern.” By the 1970s, America’s energy
needs had changed dramatically, and the oil embargo by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries “established that the
15
Nation had a need for oil that exceeded the needs of the Navy.” In
order to accommodate the increased demand for American petroleum,
President Gerald Ford and Congress passed the National Petroleum
Reserve Production Act of 1976 (“Production Act”), which gave the

11. Tim Bradner, Murkowski Slams NPR-A Plan, Conservation Groups Pleased, Alaska J.
Commerce (Aug. 13, 2012, 1:47 PM), www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/AugustIssue-2-2012/Murkowski-slams-NPR-A-plan-conservation-groups-pleased.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 42,
and 43 U.S.C.).
13. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072 (D. Alaska 2005).
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id.
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Reserve its current name and transferred authority over it from the Navy
16
to the Interior.
The NPR-A is the largest single unit of public land in the United
States, covering 23.6 million acres (or nearly 37,000 square miles) on the
Alaska North Slope, stretching from the Chuckchi Sea in the West to
Colville River delta in the East, and from the Arctic Ocean in the North
17
to the Brooks Range in the South. The NPR-A and the Western Arctic
region it inhabits boast some of the highest wilderness and wildlife values
in North America, and the region sustains many species of fish and
wildlife that are still utilized today for subsistence hunting by the Inupiat
18
Natives. Indeed, four villages inhabited primarily by Alaska Natives
exist within the Reserve’s boundaries, and the majority of these villagers
practice subsistence lifestyles that depend on the natural resources of the
19
NPR-A. Some of these indigenous populations oppose oil and gas
drilling in the Reserve, largely because the presence of heavy industry
20
frightens away the animals they hunt. Moreover, tribes have begun to
21
experience their first cases of asthma-related illnesses. Because of the
sensitive ecosystems and local populations present in the Reserve, the
Interior’s plan arguably sought to balance the interests of wildlife and
native peoples with those of the oil and gas industry.
B. The Interior’s “Preferred Alternative”
Under the Secretary’s selected plan—known as “B2” or the
“preferred alternative”—four special areas are designated as either
unavailable to oil and gas leasing or unavailable to both leasing and the
construction of new “non-subsistence” infrastructure—that is,
22
infrastructure used to support petroleum production. NPR-A land not
23
within these special areas will be open for petroleum leasing.
The special areas designated by the Interior contain a rich
abundance of wildlife and sensitive ecosystems. Perhaps the most well
known of these areas is the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area in the
Reserve’s Northeast region, which the preferred alternative has marked

16. 42 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012) (transferring authority over the NPR-A to the Interior and renaming
the plan).
17. Brief for Appellant at 4, N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (2005) (No. 0535085), 2005 WL 1912173, at *4.
18. Background of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, Audubon Alaska,
http://ak.audubon.org/background-national-petroleum-reserve-alaska (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
19. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d at 973.
20. Karin McDougal, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, et al. v. Kempthorne: A Win for the Environment or
an Example of NEPA’s Shortcomings?, 13 Drake J. Agric. L. 437, 439 (2008).
21. Id.
22. See infra Appendix A; see also Map of Proposed Alternative, infra Appendix B.
23. Id.
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as unavailable both to leasing and new non-subsistence construction. In
addition to housing the area’s dominant lake feature, the area also
“includes important nesting, staging and molting habitat for a large
25
number of waterfowl and shorebirds.” As much as thirty percent of the
population of Brant goose on the Pacific flyway may be present in the
26
Teshekpuk Lake Special Area during molting season. Additionally, the
expanse near Teshekpuk Lake is a major calving area for the
27
approximately 55,000-strong Teshekpuk Caribou Herd.
To the South of the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area lies the Colville
28
River corridor, a 2.44 million acre region that the Interior has deemed a
special area but nonetheless has not designated as off-limits to oil and gas
29
leasing. The Colville River Special Area contains a high density of
nesting raptors and “has been recognized since the 1950s as one of the
30
most significant regional habitats for raptors in North America.”
West of the Colville River, the Utukok Uplands Special Area is the
primary calving ground for the Western Arctic Caribou Herd, which, at a
31
population estimated at 325,000, ranks as Alaska’s largest caribou herd.
Moreover, the Utukok Uplands provide crucial habitat for numerous
32
wolverines and grizzly bears. Unlike the Colville River Special Area,
the vast majority of the Utukok Uplands Special Area has been placed
off limits to petroleum development and new non-subsistence
33
infrastructure.
Two other special areas—the Kasegaluk Lagoon and Peard Bay
regions in the Reserve’s northwest—have also been designated as
34
unavailable to leasing. Offshore regions bordering these areas provide
significant habitats for beluga whales, walruses, and numerous varieties
35
of ice seals. Further, the Reserve’s northwest coast serves as a denning
site for polar bears, which were listed as “threatened” under the
36
Endangered Species Act in 2008.

24. See infra Appendix A.
25. 1 Dep’t of the Interior, Final Integrated Activity Plan/Environmental Impact
Statement 355 (2012) [hereinafter Final IAP/EIS Vol. 1].
26. Id. at 251.
27. Id. at 283.
28. Id. at 355.
29. See infra Appendix A.
30. Final IAP/EIS Vol. 1, supra note 25.
31. Id. at 287.
32. Id. at 298, 302.
33. See infra Appendix A.
34. Id.
35. Background of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, supra note 18.
36. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for
the Polar Bear (Ursus Maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,212 (May 15, 2008)
(codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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C. The National Petroleum Reserve Production Act of 1976
In addition to transferring NPR-A land to the DOI, the Production
Act required the Secretary to “commence further petroleum exploration
37
of the reserve” and “conduct an expeditious program of competitive
38
leasing of oil and gas in the [NPR-A].” The statute granted the
Secretary discretion to promulgate rules and regulations for “the
protection of environmental, fish and wildlife, and historical or scenic
39
values” of the Reserve. It also provided that “[a]ny exploration within
the Utukok River, the Teshekpuk Lake areas, and other areas
designated by the Secretary of the Interior containing any significant
subsistence, recreational, fish and wildlife, or historical or scenic value,
shall be conducted in a manner which will assure the maximum
protection” of these values to the extent consistent with the Production
40
Act. In 1977, the Secretary relied on this authority to impose
“maximum protective measures” to protect the migratory waterfowl and
41
shorebirds of the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area. The Secretary also
placed restrictions on low-level aircraft flights in order to protect the
then-endangered Arctic Peregrine Falcon residing in the Colville River
Special Area and caribou herds roaming in the Utukok River Uplands
42
Special Area.
Additionally, the Production Act ordered the DOI to conduct a
study to determine “the best uses” for NPR-A land; to this end, the Act
mandated that the study examine the Reserve’s mineral potential,
indigenous populations, and its “scenic, historical, recreational, fish and
43
wildlife, and wilderness values.” This directive permitted the DOI to
designate environmentally sensitive areas, making vast swaths of the
44
NPR-A off limits to oil development. As one observer noted,
“Congress has recognized the Reserve as a potential source for oil and
gas exploration and production,” but Congress’s inclusion of numerous
provisions in the Production Act regarding the environmental values of
the Reserve “assur[ed] that environmental concerns would not be
45
overlooked.”
In other words, the plain language of the Production Act appears to
balance the desire for petroleum exploration with the recognition of the

37. 42 U.S.C. § 6504(d) (2012)
38. Id. § 6506a(a).
39. Id. § 6503(b).
40. Id. § 6504(a).
41. National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska Designation of Special Areas, 42 Fed. Reg. 28,723,
28,723 (June 2, 1977).
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6505(c)(1).
44. McDougal, supra note 20.
45. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072 (D. Alaska 2005).
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Reserve’s abundant flora and fauna. Although the NPR-A’s name may
suggest otherwise, it is clear from the statute’s language that the
Production Act sought to ensure that the Reserve would not be
subjected to petroleum exploitation without due consideration of its
impact on the region’s natural resources.
D. Alaska’s Interest in Oil Development
Predictably, Alaska is eager to expand the state’s oil and gas
development because income from petroleum leases accounts for ninety
46
percent of the state’s tax revenues. Alaska received $7 billion from oil
companies in 2011, an increase from $6.2 billion the previous year, and
47
nearly $8.9 billion in 2012. Largely because of the state’s oil revenue,
48
Alaska now holds the largest cash reserves of any state, at $12.1 billion.
State residents also stand to benefit from increased petroleum
development because of annual dividends paid by a special state
investment fund known as the Alaska Permanent Fund. The Fund,
created by amendment to the Alaska state constitution in 1976, provides
that “at least 25 percent of all mineral lease rentals” and other sources of
49
mineral royalties be set aside for Alaska’s residents. From 1982 through
2009, the Fund paid about $17.5 billion in dividends to Alaskans through
50
the annual distribution of dividend checks. These dividends are an
important source of income for many Alaskans, especially those living in
51
rural areas.
Alaska is also interested in opening up the NPR-A because the
Production Act mandates that fifty percent of all mineral leasing revenue
on NPR-A land be paid to the state and spent at Alaska’s discretion,
52
rather than remaining in the U.S. Treasury’s reserves. Furthermore,
production from the Prudhoe Bay field, situated east of the Reserve, is
declining due to the depletion of the massive oil field’s initial discoveries,
and active development on the periphery of Prudhoe Bay has been too
53
small to fully offset the main field’s decline. Directly to the East of

46. Maureen Farrell, Alaska’s Oil Windfall, CNN Money (Feb. 29, 2012, 5:57 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/29/markets/alaska_oil/index.htm.
47. Id.; Alaska’s Oil & Gas Industry, Alaska Resource Development Council,
http://www.akrdc.org/issues/oilgas/overview.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
48. Id.
49. What Is the Alaska Permanent Fund?, Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., http://www.apfc.org/
home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
50. The Permanent Fund Dividend, Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., http://www.apfc.org/home/
Content/dividend/dividend.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 6506a(l) (2012).
53. History of Northern Alaska Petroleum Development, Am. Petroleum Inst.,
http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-overview/exploration-and-production/alaska/northern-alaskapetroleum-development.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
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Prudhoe Bay lies the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which is closed to
oil development. Thus, the oil industry has set its sights West, to the
NPR-A.

II. Legislative History of the Production Act
Section 104 of the Production Act directs the Interior Secretary to
incorporate environmental considerations into her determinations
regarding the extent to which Reserve land is to be subjected to oil
exploration. Specifically, the provision seeks to assure the maximum
protection of wildlife and scenic values for the exploration of the
Reserve within the Utukok River area, the Teshekpuk Lake area, and
54
any other regions that the Secretary deems environmentally significant.
Notably, in language unusual among public land statutes, Congress
mandated that oil exploration within these ecologically significant areas
be “conducted in a manner which will assure the maximum protection of
55
. . . surface values.” Here, as explained more below, it is significant that
Congress used the words “assure the maximum protection,” rather than
the “withdrawal” language typical of similar statutes because this
language indicates that the preferred alternative is fully consistent with
56
the power bestowed upon the Interior by the Production Act.
The Production Act’s legislative history contains numerous
indications of Congress’s intent not to make the entire swath of NPR-A
land open to oil and gas drilling. Congress chose to allow for managed
oversight of the Reserve, one that considers wildlife and scenic values
alongside those of the petroleum industry. The Production Act
Conference Committee’s Joint Statement (“Statement”), which describes
the reconciled version of the House and Senate forms of the Production
Act, stated the Committee’s intent to vest in the Interior the
responsibility to consider environmental values “so that any activities
which are or might be detrimental to such values will be carefully
57
controlled.”
The Statement noted that, “[w]hile ‘maximum protection of such
surface values’ is not a prohibition of exploration-related activities within
[sensitive NPR-A] areas, it is intended that such exploration operations

54. 42 U.S.C. § 6504(a).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. For detailed analysis of the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act’s (“ANILCA”)
use of the term “withdrawal” and its applicability to the Reserve’s management prescriptions, see infra
Part IV
57. H.R. Rep. No. 94-942, at 20 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter Conference Report]. Joint
conference committee reports are highly influential pieces of legislative histories; indeed, former Chief
Justice William Rehnquist once observed that “some types of legislative history are substantially more
reliable than others,” and cited the report of a joint conference committee as an example of a superior
form of legislative history. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 17 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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will be conducted in a manner which will minimize the adverse impact on
58
the environment.” The Statement noted explicitly that the Interior
Secretary “may designate certain areas—including specifically the
Utukok River area and the Teshekpuk Lake area—where special
precautions may be necessary to control activities which would disrupt
59
the surface values” of the region. Further, it was “expected that the
Secretary [would] take every precaution to avoid unnecessary surface
damage and to minimize ecological disturbances throughout the
60
[R]eserve.”
In discussions about the Statement on the floor of the House of
Representatives, Rep. John Melcher, the House sponsor of the Act,
stated the Conference Committee’s intent that oil and gas exploration on
NPR-A land “be designed to minimize disturbance to fish and wildlife
habitat and [that] exploration activities be planned so that interference
with fish and wildlife populations during critical use seasons is
61
curtailed.” Melcher further elucidated the intent of the Production Act,
which was “to carefully explore and determine the petroleum potential
of the [R]eserve while simultaneously identifying and protecting other
62
important resources[,] values[,] and uses.”
The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which was
closely involved in considering drafts of the House version of the
Production Act, affirmed the importance of considering the wildlife and
63
many other values of the vast Reserve land. The Committee
determined that the Secretary was “best qualified” to determine how to
64
appropriately protect these values.
Thus, the details provided by the Statement make it clear that the
Production Act’s purpose was not to cede all of the NPR-A to oil and gas
leasing. To the contrary, the committee’s statements highlighted above
depict the Secretary’s discretionary power to carefully control the surface
65
values of the area. The use of the phrase “may designate” in the
66
Conference Report
further indicates the discretionary latitude
bestowed upon the Secretary to preserve the Reserve’s wildlife and
scenic values. Thus, the Interior’s preferred alternative is fully aligned
with the Production Act’s language and its stated intent as outlined in the
Conference Report and other forms of legislative history. This is

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Conference Report, supra note 57, at 21.
Id.
Id.
122 Cong. Rec. 8886, 8887 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (statement of Rep. John Melcher).
Id. (emphasis added).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-81, pt. I, at 8 (1975).
Id.
Conference Report, supra note 57, at 20.
See Letter from Gov. Sean Parnell, supra note 10.
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especially true with regard to the Interior’s decision to ban petroleum
67
leasing in the Utukok River and Teshekpuk Lake areas, two
particularly important and ecologically sensitive regions that were
singled out by Congress as warranting additional protections.

III. ANILCA and the “No More” Clause
A. Background of ANILCA
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed the Alaska National Interest
Land Conservation Act, which “created numerous new federal
properties in Alaska in order to maintain a ‘proper balance between the
reservation of’ land for conservation and the disposition of ‘those public
68
lands necessary and appropriate for more intensive use.’” The Act,
designed in part as a major land conservation statute, sought to preserve,
among other things, wildlife habitat: Alaska’s tundra, forest, and coastal
rainforest ecosystems; the natural resources utilized by subsistence
hunters; the recreational and scientific opportunities of the region; and
the “unrivaled scenic and geological values associated with natural
69
landscapes.”
To this end, the Act provided for the creation of fifteen National
Park Service properties, set aside roughly 97.5 million acres in new and
expanded “conservation system units,” and created 56.4 million acres of
70
wilderness. ANILCA also provided for various studies regarding the
efficacy of oil and gas exploration and the implementation of an oil and
71
gas leasing program on certain Alaskan federal lands. Additionally, the
law’s passage was fueled in part by strong opposition to numerous
National Monument proclamations issued by President Carter and, as a
72
result, ANILCA revoked many of these designations.
B. ANILCA’s “No More” Clause
Because Congress believed that ANILCA properly balanced
environmental and economic interests, it determined that the statute
obviated the need for subsequent legislation to conserve Alaska’s public

67. See infra Appendix A.
68. Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d)
(2012)).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d).
70. ANILCA defines “conservation system unit” as “any unit in Alaska of the National Park
System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails
System, National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument.” Id. § 3102(4).
71. See, e.g., id. § 3141 (outlining an overall study program for affected lands); id. § 3147
(providing for an Arctic research study).
72. See id. § 3209(a).
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land. Consequently, Congress inserted section 1326 into ANILCA,
which has come to be known as the “no more” clause. Section 1326
states:
No future executive branch action which withdraws more than five
thousand acres, in the aggregate, of public lands within the State of
Alaska shall be effective except by compliance with this subsection. To
the extent authorized by existing law, the President or the Secretary
may withdraw public lands in the State of Alaska exceeding five
thousand acres in the aggregate, which withdrawal shall not become
effective until notice is provided in the Federal Register and to both
Houses of Congress. Such withdrawal shall terminate unless Congress
passes a joint resolution of approval within one year after the notice of
such withdrawal has been submitted to Congress.
No further studies of Federal lands in the State of Alaska for the
single purpose of considering the establishment of a conservation
system unit, national recreation area, national conservation area, or for
related or similar purposes shall be conducted unless authorized by this
74
Act or further Act of Congress.

Thus, the “no more” clause essentially sought to prevent the Executive
from further conserving significant portions of Alaska’s public lands. By
prohibiting the Executive from formally “withdrawing” (a term that is
75
described further below) Alaska’s public lands, the “no more” clause
was an attempt to halt the tide of conservation on such lands.
The “no more” clause will likely be invoked in the fight against the
implementation of the preferred alternative. The oil and gas industry will
likely argue that section 1326(a) clearly prohibits Executive withdrawals
of more than 5000 acres of Alaskan federal land absent congressional
approval. In all probability, Congress will not grant the Interior the
necessary approval within one year of its decision. As a result, this
13.38 million acre “withdrawal” of NPR-A land must terminate within a
year of the preferred alternative’s issuance, and the Interior should then
open the remaining area of the land to oil and gas development.
As argued below, the Interior should respond that it is not
exercising its withdrawal powers within the meaning of section 1326(a),
but is merely operating under its statutorily prescribed discretionary
power to designate some lands as unavailable to oil and gas leasing. Put
another way, if the Interior is not exercising its withdrawal powers, it is
not acting within the realm of the “no more” clause’s proscription on
Executive withdrawals and, thus, it cannot be prevented from conserving
more of Alaska’s public lands.

73. Id. § 3101(d).
74. Id. § 3213(a)−(b).
75. For a description of the meaning of “withdrawal,” see infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.

L - Aurora_12 (M. STEVENS) (Do Not Delete)

May 2014]

5/26/2014 10:51 AM

DRILL HERE NOT THERE

1177

C. Meaning of “Withdrawal” Under ANILCA Section 1326
ANILCA does not define the term “withdrawal.” Thus, “[i]n the
absence of a definition of the term in ANILCA, [courts] must look to
how other, related statutes define withdrawal, as well as to the context in
76
which the term is used in the statute at issue.” One such statute is the
Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), for which
the term “withdrawal”means:
[W]ithholding an area of Federal land from settlement, sale, location,
or entry, under some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of
limiting activities under those laws in order to maintain other public
values in the area or reserving the area for a particular public purpose
77
or program.

In other words, a withdrawal removes a portion of federal land from sale,
lease, or use “in order to preserve a public value in the area or for a
78
public purpose.”
Because numerous other ANILCA provisions mirror the FLPMA
definition of withdrawal, it is reasonable and in accordance with the
canons of statutory interpretation to apply the FLPMA definition to
79
ANILCA’s use of the term. For instance, ANILCA section 1322, which
relates to the statute’s effect on withdrawals of land made prior to its
enactment, states that withdrawn lands “shall not be deemed available
80
for selection, appropriation, or disposition.” As the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia has held, use of the phrase
“selection, appropriation, and disposition” in section 1322 reflects the
phrase “settlement, sale, location or entry” used in the FLPMA
81
definition of withdrawal.

76. Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 143 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300–03 (2006); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564–65 (1988)).
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (2012). Recent designations under the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33
(2012), have also utilized similar withdrawal language. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8750, 76 Fed. Reg.
68,625 (Nov. 7, 2012) (establishing Fort Monroe National Monument); Proclamation No. 8884, 77 Fed.
Reg. 62,413 (Oct. 12, 2012) (establishing César E. Chávez National Monument); Proclamation No. 8868,
77 Fed. Reg. 59,275 (Sept. 27, 2012) (establishing Chimney Rock National Monument); Proclamation
No. 8803, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,579 (Apr. 25, 2012) (establishing Ford Ord National Monument).
78. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 761 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986); see also New
Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A withdrawal exempts the covered land
from the operation of public land laws.”); Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (“[A] withdrawal exempts
covered land from the operation of laws that otherwise authorize the transfer of federal lands to the
private domain for private use.”).
79. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec. of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (“The normal rule of statutory
construction assumes that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have
the same meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is
used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear.”).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 3209(a).
81. Se. Conference, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
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Another ANILCA provision regarding a management plan for
Alaska’s Bristol Bay mandated that specified lands “be withdrawn from
82
all forms of appropriation under the public land laws.” This wording
mirrors the FLPMA definition that a withdrawal serves to withhold land
83
from disposal “under some or all of the general land laws.”
Lastly, it is also reasonable to presume that Congress intended to
import the FLPMA definition of withdrawal into ANILCA because
FLPMA was passed in 1976, a mere four years before ANLICA. When
ANILCA’s framers enacted the statute, they likely had FLPMA’s
withdrawal definition in mind because the two laws were enacted within
only a few years of each other and during a time of increased debate
surrounding federal land use policy.
D. Unique Wording of the “No More” Clause
ANILCA’s “no more” clause proscribes “executive branch actions
84
which withdraw,”
as opposed to “executive withdrawals” or
85
“withdrawals,” as the term is commonly used. Consequently, advocates
for a broad interpretation of the “no more” clause could argue that the
clause’s unique wording prohibits both traditional withdrawals and
Executive actions that are similar to withdrawals, even if those actions do
not rise to the level of a formal FLPMA “withdrawal.” Such a fine
parsing of the “no more” clause would aid the oil and gas industry’s
efforts to halt conservation in the Reserve, as a broad reading of the “no
more” clause means that actions that are similar to, but technically
distinct from, withdrawals would also fall under the clause’s ambit and
further prohibit conservation attempts by the Executive branch.
Such an interpretation of Congress’s wording construes the “no
more” clause as a shield against Executive actions that use traditional
withdrawal mechanisms—such as the Antiquities Act, which authorizes
traditional Executive withdrawals to preserve historical and natural
86
landmarks —as well as those Executive actions that have the purpose

82. 16 U.S.C. § 3183(f).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (2012). For other ANILCA provisions reflecting the Federal Land Policy
Management Act definition of withdrawal, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3200(a) (mandating that certain
Alaskan lands be “withdrawn from all forms of entry or appropriation” under the mining and mineral
leasing laws); 16 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (same); id. § 410hh-5 (directing that specified lands be “withdrawn
from all forms of appropriation or disposal under the public land laws”).
84. Id. § 3213(a) (emphasis added).
85. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (defining “withdrawal” under FLMPA).
86. Id. §§ 431–33. The Antiquities Act authorizes the President to protect “historic landmarks,
historical and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest” by declaring them
national monuments. Id. § 431. Since the statute’s enactment, “large areas such as Grand Canyon, Death
Valley, and Glacier Bay National Parks were first protected by Presidential proclamation under this
statute. President Clinton revived the statute from nearly two decades of disuse, and employed it to
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and effect of withdrawing land but are not named as such (in other
words, de facto withdrawals). This argument, however, belies the plain
language of the “no more” clause and advances a misguided
interpretation of congressional intent.
First, the canons of statutory interpretation support giving effect to
the plain meaning of the “no more” clause, which on its face prohibits
Executive branch withdrawals only in the traditional sense. Although the
“no more” clause uses atypical phrasing, it still discusses Executive
withdrawals and does not facially indicate that its purpose is to expand
the meaning of a commonly understood term. It is a longstanding canon
of statutory interpretation that Congress intends to use ordinary words in
their ordinary senses, as “[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce
87
it according to its terms.” If Congress wanted ANILCA to use a
different definition of “withdrawal” than is customary, it stands to reason
that it would have included a definition of the term in the statute or at
least provided a rationale for phrasing the “no more” clause in the
manner that it did. Because this is not the case, courts should remain
faithful to the plain meaning of the statute, which proscribes formal
withdrawals in the traditional sense of the term.
Alternatively, even if opposition to the preferred alternative
succeeded in convincing a court that the “no more” clause is facially
ambiguous, the Interior could also rely on the statutory canon of in pari
materia to argue that the scope of the “no more” clause is limited to
traditional withdrawals. Under this interpretation, an ambiguous
statute’s meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the
88
same subject matter. Here, then, the Interior would point to the
definitions of “withdrawal” in FLPMA—and as used in the Antiquities
Act—in order to strengthen their argument that these definitions should
be read into the “no more” clause.
ANILCA’s legislative history further suggests reading the “no
more” clause as a limitation only on Executive withdrawal powers as
traditionally understood. The bill that eventually became ANILCA,
89
House Report (“H.R.”) 39, did not include section 1326 and similarly,
“section 1326 was not included in the version of H.R. 39 reported to the
full Senate by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

protect more acres of federal land than any chief executive other than Jimmy Carter.” George Cameron
Coggins et al., Federal Public Land and Resources Law 24 (6th ed. 2007).
87. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
88. Black’s Law Dictionary 862 (9th ed. 2009) (defining in pari materia).
89. 126 Cong. Rec. S11,183−210 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1980).
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(‘Senate Energy Committee’), which initially considered” H.R. 39.
Instead, advocates included the “no more” clause in a floor amendment
as a substitute for the reported bill out of the Senate Energy
91
Committee. As a result, there is little direct legislative history related to
92
section 1326, but what does exist makes no indication that Congress
intended to distinguish between “executive branch action which
93
withdraws” and the traditional definition of “withdrawal.”
When former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens officially introduced the
“no more” clause on the Senate floor, his statements suggested that
Congress did not consider the “no more” clause to encompass anything
more than traditional, formal withdrawals. Stevens stated that the
purpose of the “no more” clause was “to provide congressional oversight
for major modifications of areas established or expanded by [ANILCA]
and to require congressional approval for future major executive
94
withdrawals of certain public lands in Alaska.” Stevens then read the
amendment containing the “no more” clause, and in its original form the
clause contained the potentially disputable language proscribing
“executive branch action which withdraws” rather than simply
“withdrawals.” In his remarks, however, Stevens did not make any
explicit distinction between the two iterations, and in fact, his stated
95
purpose for the amendment speaks of “executive withdrawals” rather
96
than “executive branch action which withdraw[].”
Along with the numerous references to other types of traditional
97
withdrawals outlined in ANILCA, Stevens’s interchangeable use of the
two types of phrasing is strong evidence for reading the “no more” clause
as an attempt to curtail the Executive withdrawal power in its traditional,
statutorily defined sense.
Furthermore, much of the congressional support for ANILCA came
from opposition to President Carter’s use of the Antiquities Act to
98
withdraw seventeen tracts of Alaskan land between 1978 and 1980. In
99
addition to revoking these withdrawals, proponents of ANILCA’s “no

90. Patton Boggs LLP, The Impact of ANILCA on the Potential Designation of the Coastal
Plain of ANWR as a National Monument 7 (2000) [hereinafter Patton Boggs Brief].
91. H.R. 39, 96th Cong. (as amended by Sen. Paul Tsongas, Amendment no. 1961, Apr. 17, 1980);
126 Cong. Rec. S11,063 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1980) (reporting Senator Tsongas calling up the modified
amendment).
92. Patton Boggs Brief, supra note 90, at 10.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
94. 126 Cong. Rec. at S11,054.
95. Id. at S11,052.
96. Id. at S11,054.
97. See infra Part IV.C.
98. See, e.g., Eric. C. Rusnak, The Straw That Broke the Camel’s Back? Grand Staircase—
Escalante National Monument Antiquates the Antiquities Act, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 669, 686–89 (2003).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 3209(a) (2012).
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more” clause viewed the clause as a defense against future Executive
withdrawals in Alaska pursuant to the Antiquities Act, under which
Executive actions are always considered withdrawals in the traditional
100
sense of the term.
Former Alaska Senator Mike Gravel confirmed the Act’s intent to
shield the state from future Antiquities Act pronouncements when he
praised the “no more” clause for protecting his state against a future
“President who will exercise against Alaska the injustice that took place
at the hands of [President Carter] in his use of the Antiquities Act and at
101
the hands of the [Interior] Secretary in his use of” FLPMA.
Additionally, before the “no more” clause was inserted into ANILCA,
Gravel sent a letter to the Senate Energy Committee expressing his
desire for the insertion of “a provision barring further conservation
system designations through administration action such as the
102
Antiquities Act.”
Gravel also praised section 1326(b) because it
exempted Alaska “from the wilderness study provisions of FLPMA in
103
the just belief that with passage of this bill enough is enough.” Because
104
and FLPMA are both classic withdrawal
the Antiquities Act
mechanisms, Gravel’s explicit mention of the need for protection against
these statutes further indicates that Congress intended the “no more”
clause to proscribe only formalistic withdrawals.
Consequently, it is clear from the canons of construction and
ANILCA’s legislative history that the unique phrasing of section 1326
does not permit it to proscribe actions other than withdrawals in the
traditional sense of the word. Any argument suggesting otherwise would
likely be dismissed as mere semantic quibbling.

IV. The Preferred Alternative Does Not Propose a
“Withdrawal”
A. Implied Statutory Repeals Are Not Favored
The Interior is fulfilling its statutory obligations under the
Production Act by balancing the energy resources of the Reserve with
environmental considerations. To interpret ANILCA’s “no more” clause
as a restriction on that obligation would be akin to allowing ANILCA to
implicitly repeal the Production Act. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that, while a statute can operate to amend or even repeal
a previous statutory provision, “repeals by implication are not favored”
and the “intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Coggins, supra note 86, at 24.
126 Cong. Rec. S11,183, S11,188 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1980).
S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 446 (1979).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
For a list of recent withdrawals effectuated pursuant to the Antiquities Act, see supra note 77.
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105

manifest.” A court should not infer a statutory repeal “unless the later
statute expressly contradict[s] the original act or unless such a
construction is absolutely necessary . . . in order” for a provision to retain
106
meaning.
The Court should not abandon its requirement for an explicit
directive authorizing a statutory repeal. There is nothing in ANILCA—
neither in the “no more” clause nor anywhere else—that expressly
manifests an intention to repeal the environmental provisions of the
107
Production Act. Repeals by implication should be avoided, and the
Production Act would retain its original intent if the “no more” clause
was interpreted to find that the Interior’s discretionary actions pursuant
to the Production Act do not constitute withdrawals. In other words, a
court reviewing the Interior’s preferred alternative should hold that the
flexible nature of the Interior’s leasing program is consistent with the “no
more” clause.
The fact that Congress passed significant amendments to the
108
Production Act just weeks after ANILCA’s enactment further suggests
that Congress did not intend for the Production Act’s management
prescriptions to conflict with the “no more” clause. One such Production
Act reform required activities to consider “such conditions, restrictions,
and prohibitions as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate to
mitigate reasonably foreseeable and significantly adverse effects on the
109
surface resources” of the Reserve. This provision reauthorized the
Secretary’s discretionary power to protect the Reserve’s abundant
ecological treasures; indeed, the subsection’s use of the term
“prohibitions” is especially applicable with regard to the Interior’s recent
decision to prohibit oil and gas leasing on some of the Reserve’s land.
Various other Production Act reforms passed shortly after
ANILCA’s enactment also speak of the Secretary’s ability to consider
110
natural resource conservation in NPR-A management decisions,

105. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted).
106. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (“[T]he cardinal rule . . . that repeals by
implication are not favored.”).
108. Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing the plaintiff’s assertion
that a primary objective of ANILCA, “enacted just weeks before the [Production Act] was amended,
was to provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life [the
opportunity] to do so” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 6506a(b) (2012).
110. See id. § 6506a(j)(1) (permitting NPR-A oil and gas lessees to unite with each other to operate
under a single agreement “for the purpose of conservation of the natural resources” and “if the
Secretary determines the [lessee unification] action to be necessary or advisable in the public interest,”
with “public interest” defined to include considerations of the “impact to surface resources of the
leases”); id. § 6506a(k)(1)(A) (authorizing the Secretary to “waive, suspend, or reduce the rental fees
or minimum royalty” on leaseholds in order to encourage increased oil and gas recovery or “in the
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further signaling Congress’ intent for the Reserve to be managed with
attention to both industry and environmental interests. Perhaps most
importantly, the 1980 Production Act reforms explicitly continued the
protections outlined in the Act’s original section 104(a), which maintains
that oil exploration near the Utukok River and Teshekpuk Lake areas,
along with any other NPR-A areas the Secretary deems ecologically
111
significant, shall be subject to maximum protections.
Especially when viewed in light of its chronological proximity to
ANILCA’s enactment, the increased environmental safeguards provided
for in the Production Act amendments indicate that Congress did not
intend decisions such as the Interior’s preferred alternative to be subject
to the constraints of ANILCA section 1326. If Congress had intended
such discretionary management decisions to be withdrawals for the
purposes of ANILCA, it would not have promoted conservation and
ecological planning in the Production Act just a few weeks after
ANILCA’s passage. If it had wanted this result, it is reasonable to
assume that Congress would have explicitly pulled the new Production
Act provisions under the guise of the “no more” clause at the time of
their enactment or, at the very least, omitted much of the conservation
language from the Production Act reforms. The cases described in the
following two sections serve as additional evidence that the preferred
alternative does not constitute a “withdrawal” under ANILCA.
B. SOUTHEAST CONFERENCE V. VILSACK
Courts have properly concluded that the Executive’s conservation
efforts in Alaska do not rise to the level of formal “withdrawals.” For
example, a court hearing an allegation that the preferred alternative’s
refusal to issue leases constitutes a prohibited withdrawal under the “no
more” clause should look to the reasoning of the D.C. District Court in
112
Southeast Conference v. Vilsack for guidance.
In Southeast Conference, several cities and nonprofit corporations in
Alaska brought suit against the U.S. Forest Service, alleging that the
Forest Service’s plan to reduce the amount of available land in the
Tongass National Forest for timber harvesting violated the “no more”
113
clause. Similar to the preferred alternative, the plan at issue in
Southeast Conference sought to promote “the ecological, social, and
economic values derived from” the 16.8 million acre Tongass National
interest of conservation”); id. § 6506a(k)(3) (articulating the procedures involving a lessee’s
suspension of payments “[i]f the Secretary, in the interest of conservation,” suspends a lessee’s
petroleum production).
111. Id. § 6506a(n)(2) (“[A]ny exploration or production undertaken pursuant to this section shall
be in accordance with section 6504(a) of this title.”).
112. Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 143 (D.D.C. 2010).
113. Id.
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Forest in Southeast Alaska. To this end, the Forest Service allowed
timber harvesting on vast swaths of Tongass Forest land, but also
designated 1.22 million acres as “old growth reserves” and prohibited
115
timber harvesting on these lands.
The plaintiffs in Southeast Conference contended that the “old
growth reserves” designation “withdr[ew] more than 5,000 acres from the
116
timber harvest” and thereby violated the “no more” clause. The
Southeast Conference court, however, rejected this argument. After
extensive explanation showing that the FLPMA definition of
“withdrawal” should also be used in the context of ANILCA’s “no
more” clause, the court concluded that the Forest Service’s action did not
constitute a withdrawal because there was no evidence “that the [old
growth reserve] designations here have the effect of suspending any
117
public land laws,” an essential element of a formal “withdrawal.”
Instead, the designation was simply an example of the Forest Service’s
legislatively mandated responsibility to plan for multiple uses of federal
118
land.
Much like the plan for the Tongass National Forest, the preferred
alternative represents adherence to the Interior’s statutory responsibility
under the Production Act to “assure the maximum protection of” the
119
land’s significant ecological and scenic values.
Additionally, the
Interior’s refusal to issue leases on certain Reserve lands should not be
considered a withdrawal because, much like the designation of “old
growth reserves” at issue in Southeast Conference, the preferred
alternative “neither exempt[s] lands from the operation of public land
120
laws nor suspend[s] the operation of those laws on certain lands.” A
land-use designation such as the one outlined in the preferred alternative
simply has “no effect on laws that authorize the transfer of federal lands
121
to the private domain.” In fact, the only court to consider the
contention that “land use designations are withdrawals summarily
122
rejected it.”
The Interior’s defense of the preferred alternative may actually be
stronger than its defense of the old growth reserves in Southeast
Conference. Under the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”),
the Forest Service was obliged to outline a detailed “plan” for Tongass

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 6504 (2012).
Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
Id.
Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1315 (W.D. Wash. 1994)).
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123

management, whereas the Production Act mandates no such action.
NFMA’s formalistic management plan requirements are more in line
with FLPMA’s procedural withdrawal requirements, which stand in
contrast to the discretionary authority that the Production Act provides
to the Secretary. Put another way, because the Production Act does not
explicitly mandate that the Interior promulgate a “plan” for management
of the Reserve, the Production Act does not rise to the same level of
procedural formality outlined in NFMA or FLPMA. As a result, the
preferred alternative presents an even stronger case than Southeast
Conference for withstanding a “no more” clause attack because the
Production Act’s lack of formalistic planning requirements could be
viewed as a substantial discretionary allowance to the Interior rather
than a blueprint for rigid withdrawal proceedings. Bob Marshall Alliance
v. Hodel also bolsters the argument that the preferred alternative does
not advocate a formal Executive withdrawal.
C. BOB MARSHALL ALLIANCE V. HODEL
124

In Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
FLPMA’s definition of “withdrawal,” to institute the rule that a
“‘[w]ithdrawal’ of public lands requires a formal procedure which, for
parcels exceeding 5000 acres, includes congressional approval; the land is
effectively segregated from the operation of public land laws for a period
125
of up to 20 years.” In Bob Marshall, wilderness groups brought suit
against the Interior, other federal agencies, and private lessees to
challenge the issuance of oil and gas leases in Montana’s Lewis and Clark
126
National Forest. One of Bob Marshall’s defendant lessees, in an
argument similar to one the oil and gas industry could mount against the
preferred alternative, asserted “that if the agencies had either denied or
deferred action on . . . lease applications, their action would have
constituted an illegal administrative ‘withdrawal’ of [the region] from
127
mineral leasing.”
In support of this assertion, the defendant lessee cited Mountain
128
States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, in which the plaintiff alleged that
the inaction of the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management on
applications for oil and gas leases in national forests constituted a
129
“withdrawal” under FLPMA.
The Mountain States court agreed,
stating that the agencies effectively placed large areas of federal land off
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012).
852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1224–25.
Id. at 1229.
499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980).
Id. at 386.
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limits from oil and gas leasing in order to protect wildlife. The U.S.
District Court in Wyoming then declared that “[w]e cannot allow the
[d]efendants to accomplish by inaction what they could not do by formal
131
administrative order.”
But Bob Marshall rejected this analysis, declaring that “Mountain
132
States is not binding on us and we do not find its reasoning persuasive.”
The Ninth Circuit elaborated:
We fail to see how a decision not to issue oil and gas leases . . . would
be equivalent to a formal withdrawal. [Defendant] cites only one case,
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, as authority for the
proposition that deferring action on oil and gas lease applications can
constitute an unlawful administrative withdrawal. . . . In that case, the
court concluded that the Interior and Agriculture Departments had
illegally withdrawn over a million acres of land because they had failed
to act on oil and gas lease applications and had thereby removed the
land from the operation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Yet as the
court acknowledged, the Mineral Leasing Act gives the Interior
Secretary discretion to determine which land are to be leased under the
statute. We have held that the Mineral Leasing Act allows the
Secretary to lease such lands, but does not require him to do so. . . .
[T]he Secretary has discretion to refuse to issue any lease at all on a
133
given tract.

Just as with the mineral leases in Bob Marshall, the Interior has
authorization to use its discretion to determine the specific NPR-A areas
to be subjected to oil and gas leases. As noted in Part II, the Production
Act contains provisions detailing the Reserve’s importance as a source of
domestic petroleum and a significant ecological resource. Thus, similar to
the Bob Marshall court’s conclusion that the Mineral Leasing Act grants
the Secretary discretion to issue oil and gas leases, ANILCA’s attempt to
strike a balance between petroleum exploration and environmental
considerations leaves the Secretary discretion to refuse issuing leases on
134
given tracts of the Reserve.
In fact, some provisions of ANILCA explicitly exempt leasing
135
programs on the Reserve from immediate exploration. Thus, the
statutory scheme established by the Production Act and ANILCA
governing petroleum development and environmental management on
NPR-A land is analogous to the mineral leasing at issue in Bob Marshall.
A court considering the Interior’s decision not to issue leases on various

130. Id. at 391, 397.
131. Id.
132. Bob Marshall, 852 F.2d at 1230.
133. Id. at 1229–30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
134. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3148 (2012) (outlining the oil and gas leasing program for Alaskan lands
and granting leeway to the Secretary to approve or deny leases).
135. Id. § 3148(a).
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tracts of Reserve land should afford the agency the same discretionary
freedom as it was granted in Bob Marshall.
Accordingly, Southeast Conference and Bob Marshall strongly
support the assertion that the protection of land under the preferred
alternative does not constitute a “withdrawal” under ANICLA. Thus,
the preferred alternative does not contravene the “no more” clause and
should be upheld by any court that reviews it.

Conclusion
The Interior’s recent decision to open roughly half of NPR-A land
to petroleum leasing while placing the rest of the Reserve off limits to
such leases represents a measured approach to federal land-use planning.
The preferred alternative balances multiple interests through its
protections for much of the area’s abundant ecological resources and
allows for the development of nearly three-quarters of the Reserve’s
estimated petroleum holdings. The execution of the preferred alternative
neither contravenes the “no more” clause nor any other statutory
provisions. In fact, the preferred alternative is in full compliance with the
Interior’s responsibilities the Production Act and ANILCA. As a result,
any future court reviewing a challenge to the preferred alternative should
respect the Interior’s decision and allow the various stakeholders to
proceed under the preferred alternative as it stands.
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Appendix A: NPR-A IAP/EIS Alternatives: Major Land
Allocations & Estimates of Economically Recoverable Oil & Gas
Land
Allocation

Alternative A

Alternative
B-1

Alternative B2
(“Preferred Alternative”)

Alternative C

Alternative D

Lands that
could be
offered for
O&G leasing

13 million acres
(57% of NPR-A
subsurface
available; 1.57
million deferred
until 2014;
425,000
deferred
until 2018)

11 million acres
(48% of NPR-A
subsurface;
current
deferrals
honored until
expiration)

11.8 million acres (52% of
NPR-A subsurface; current
deferrals honored until
expiration)

17.9 million
acres (76% of
NPR-A
subsurface;
current
deferrals
honored until
expiration)

22.8 million
acres (100% of
NPR-A
subsurface;
current
deferrals
honored until
expiration)

Special Areas

4 (8.3 million
acres) TLSA:
1.75 million
acres

5 (15.5 million
acres) TLSA:
3.76 million
acres

5 (13.35 million acres)
TLSA: 3.65 million
acres

5 (9.0 million
acres) TLSA:
1.87 million
acres

4 (8.3 million
acres) TLSA:
1.75 million
acres

CRSA: 2.44
million acres

CRSA: 2.44
million acres

CRSA: 2.44
million acres

CRSA: 2.44
million acres

URUSA:
3.97
million
acres
KLSA: 97,000
acres

URUSA:
7.06 million
acres
KLSA: 364,000
acres
PBSA: 1.6
million acres

URUSA: 4.44
million acres
KLSA: 97,000
acres
PBSA: 107,000
acres

URUSA:
3.97
million
acres
KLSA: 97,000
acres

Wild and
Scenic River
recommendations

0

Oil (millions of 723
95%
barrels
discovered and
undiscovered)
10.099
Gas (trillion
58%
cubic feet
discovered and
undiscovered)

CRSA: 2.44 million
acres
URUSA: 7.06 million
acres
KLSA: 97,000 acres
PBSA: 107,000 acres

12
0
Wild River
designation:
Colville
(where the
BLM manages
the bed and
both banks),
Nigu, Etivluk,
Ipnavik, Kuna,
Kiligwa, Nuka,
Awuna,
Kokolik, and
Utukok Rivers
and Driftwater
and Carbon
Creeks within
the NPR-A
50
549
66%
72%

707
93%

761
100%

8.41
48%

15.388
88%

17.391
100%

8.738
50%

0
3
Scenic River
designation:
Colville (where
the BLM
manages the
bed and both
banks), Kiligwa,
and Utukok
Rivers within
the NPR-A
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